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 All Equal under the Sun. A Normative
Analysis of the Duckworth-Lewis Rule*
Kurt Devooght
This essay identiﬁes the concept of equality implicit in the Duckworth-Lewis rain rule and
confronts it with the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian ideal advocated by such
philosophers as Rawls, Dworkin and Scanlon. While exposing the relatively ad hoc nature
of the rule, arguments are forwarded in favour of a more explicit rendering of the rule’s
conception of equality. To this end, a more egalitarian ideal is developed based upon the
principle of responsibility. According to such a concept of equality, compensation and
reward are respectively deﬁned in relation to the limits of one’s responsibility: that is, while
one should be compensated for the consequences of events deemed beyond one’s
responsibility, one should nevertheless be able to keep the fruits of actions for which one is
held responsible. The possible implications of this approach for the game of cricket are
elaborated in detail.
One of the deﬁning characteristics of cricket is the fact that both teams do not, in a
qualiﬁed sense, compete simultaneously but consecutively. The team batting ﬁrst is
able to score runs while the opposing side aims to take wickets. Only once the team
batting ﬁrst has completed its innings, canthe ﬁelding side take the pitch in an attempt
to reach the established target. This kind of consecutive play is rather exceptional
among the most popular (ﬁeld) sports, [1] arguably because such forms of
competition are too often exposed to criticisms of unfairness, unequal opportunities
and – sometimes even literally – an uneven playing ﬁeld. Indeed, those sports where
levels of performance are particularly vulnerable to the inﬂuence of external
conditions (such as weather, light, crowd involvement, etc.) are especially exposed to
these criticisms. Situations where external conditions inﬂuence the outcome of a game
to an excessive degree are often considered to undermine the ideals of fairness and
Q1
equality – two fundamental ideals essential to the constitution of any game or sport. It
should come as no surprise that cricket, in particular, is extremely susceptible to the
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40inﬂuence of such external conditions as weather and light but also the condition of the
pitch and the outﬁeld and even the state of the ball (which in turn depends on the
dampness of the outﬁeld among other things). All these elements regularly play a
signiﬁcant role in determining the outcome. Add to this that play is often spread over
several days and one could easily understand that the aforementioned criticism applies
a fortiori to the game of cricket.
This might all sound quite disturbing for the game of cricket. The game of cricket is
traditionally thought to promote the virtues of fairness and equality – a fact captured
comprehensively by the expression, ‘that’s not cricket’. Despite this, however, the game
itself is conceived such that it is extremely vulnerable to unequal playing conditions.
(Though it sounds paradoxical, it may well be that fairness, justice and equality in
relations between players are emphasized so vehemently in cricket precisely because
these aspectsarelacking in theinﬂuence of external conditions outsidethe scope of the
players’ performance and responsibility.) The unfairness inherent to the game’s
conditions of practice (or at least the vulnerability of the game to those conditions)
should not, it is thought, spill over into the domain of the players’ behaviour on and
off the ﬁeld. The outcome of the game often slips through the ﬁngers of the players
despite the quality of their performance and, worst of all, nothing at all can be done
about it. It could be argued that this situation at very least teaches cricketers to play
and enjoy cricket with the right degree of detachment and relativism.
Recently, however, a lively debate has arisen concerning certain particular methods
aimed at correcting the imbalance to which cricket is susceptible with regard to the
effects of rain in interrupted One Day International (ODIs) or Limited Overs
International (LOIs) cricket matches. Such methods – the so-called rain rules – re-
calculate the target for the team batting second after play has been interrupted at some
point during the day. Although rain rules have long been in place, the attention that
has recently accompanied the introduction of a particularly sophisticated rain rule has
been allowed to obscure the basic function of rain rules. Rain rules, in essence, attempt
to correct, under exceptional circumstances, for the dependence relation between the
result of a particular game and the external conditions in which it is played. The far-
reaching consequences of this fact for the very nature of the game are often neglected
in recent debates. The fact that rain rules are now an accepted part of the make-up of
one day cricket seems to open the door onto a slippery slope where all kind of external
conditions may be adjusted for, thus potentially changing the appearance of the game
dramatically. Why, we then might ask, is it so important to allow adjustment for the
inﬂuence of external conditions? How are equal opportunities for both teams
guaranteed? Is this in accordance with the spirit of the game, and if so, in the name of
which ideals is this adjustment allegedly effected? These and many other philosophical
questions arise although only some will be touched upon here.
The main point I wish to make in this essay is the following. Recently, rules have
been put in place which not only reset the target for rain interrupted games but also
and, in so doing, ‘correct’ – be it explicitly or implicitly – for external conditions. The
re-calculation and thus the implicit allowances are, in my view, rather ad hoc and
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80demand a more solid ethical underpinning. It shall be forwarded that rain rules in
general can only be accepted provided that their (philosophical) foundations and
consequences are well thought-out in advance.
In what follows I ﬁrst brieﬂy describe the history of rain rules in the game of cricket
(section 1). Section 2 extensively lays out the Duckworth-Lewis method, which is the
rule currently employed by the ICC. In section 3, I scrutinize the advantages and the
drawbacks of this method in the light of some properties a good rain rule should
possess. The question as to whether the Duckworth-Lewis rule is a fair rule from a
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian point of view is addressed in section 4.
Rain Rules: A Brief History
The common practice in dealing with interrupted LOIs up until 1992 was to compare
the run rates (the total number of runs scored divided by the number of completed
overs) of the competing teams. The team with the higher run rate was declared the
winner. This rule, however, tended to beneﬁt the team batting second (henceforth
referred to as Team 2) at the expense of the team batting ﬁrst (Team 1). This led to the
common practice of inviting the other team to bat ﬁrst if rainwas expected. Asa result,
this rule has often been accused of not being sufﬁciently ‘strategy-proof’, that is, of not
possessing the property of tactical neutrality as decisions could be made by the second
team in order to exploit the rule to their advantage. However, it is not the potential for
strategic play that seems to be deﬁcient in the run-rate method, since tactics belong to
the very essence of the game of cricket. The point is that the ﬁrst team does not have
the same strategic options as the second team and, in this sense, the rule does not
provide both teams with equal opportunities. Resistance to this rule appeals, therefore,
to the ideal of equality rather than to that of strategic neutrality.
Realizing that this rule is biased towards the side batting second, the Australian
Cricket Board introduced its ‘most productive overs’ rule during the 1992/93 season.
This rule calculates the target for Team 2 by taking the n highest scoring overs of Team
1 where n is the number of played overs (for example, 40 if 10 overs are lost due to
rain). Ironically, this rule was now considered as tending to favour the side batting ﬁrst
and blatantly unfair to the team batting second. [2] Why is this so? Suppose that Team
2 requires 20 off 19 balls to win, when a short shower takes three overs away. The reset
target would now be 20 off 1 ball since the three least productive overs are deduced
from the original target (which we may suppose for the sake of argument were three
maiden overs in this case). However, this seems to be unfair and even ironic: the
second team’s excellent bowling (three maiden overs) in the ﬁrst innings is now
turning against them. It would have been better for Team 2 in this case if Team 1 had
reached the same total score without any maidens. In this case, the second team is not
offered the opportunity to reap the rewards of some excellent bowling. To curb this
unfairness and other alleged blemishes and glitches, a series of other rules such as the










120end, they all proved to be unsatisfactory. The cricketing world had to wait for a rule
that could rally support on a much larger scale.
The Duckworth-Lewis Method Explained
The Duckworth-Lewis (D/L) [3] method of resetting targets in interrupted one-day
cricket matches was trialled in 1997 and chosen for use in 1998. Since then it has been
applied on many occasions including the 1999 and 2003 ICC Cricket World Cup. The
D/L method is adjusted almost yearly to accommodate for ﬂaws in the method. I shall
restrict my examination to the 2002 Standard version. A Professional version was
introduced in October 2003, in an attempt to ensure fairness to both teams in matches
where Team 1 sets an exceptionally high total.
One of the most important innovations of the D/L method is that it acknowledges
that there are two resources available to the teams with which to make as many runs as
theycan:thenumberofoverstheyreceiveandthenumberofwicketstheyhaveinhand.
Recall that the previous rules did not take account of the number of wickets in hand at
all.Thisfact isstriking,as itseemsclear thatany fairrainruleshouldtake intoaccount,
in one way or another, the quality of the performance of both teams. Including the
number of wickets in hand is a step in that direction. Duckworth and Lewis then argue
that a particular combination of these two resources – wickets in hand and overs
remaining – mustbeusedtore-calculatethetargetofTeam2.Basically,theD/Lmethod
convertsthenumberofwicketslostandthenumberofoversremainingintoa‘resource
remaining’ percentage. At the start of the innings, this is of course 100 per cent, but as
overs are completed or wickets fall this ‘resource remaining’ percentage falls.
Let us consider the D/L system as a three-step procedure. The ﬁrst step of the
procedure is conceivedto determine the (expected) numberof runs a teamwould have
scored from the extra resourcesat theirdisposal in the absence of a curtailment of their
innings. The method is based on the following formula, which calculates Z(u,w), the
expected number of runs to be scored when u overs are left to be played (0 # u # 50)
and w wickets have been lost (0 # w # 9):





The function F(w) is assumed to be a positive decreasing function and could be
interpreted as the proportion of the expected number of runs with w wickets lost
relativeto the expected numberof runs without any wickets lost (where both terms are
seen as if there was an inﬁnite number of overs remaining). For instance, F(0) must
be 1. This function was estimated based on D/L’s knowledge of cricket. The estimates
of the positive constants Z0 and b0 were obtained by ﬁtting the model to some data
from past ﬁrst class matches. The term 2b0/F(w) could be interpreted as a decay
parameter that varies with w. The abbreviation exp (for exponential) indicates that a
certain irrational number (e ¼ 2.71828...) is to have as its exponent the expression
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160in parentheses. D/L (1998) does not list the values of the constants due to what its
exponents call commercial conﬁdentiality.
What to say about this ﬁrst step? As was already stated, an important breakthrough
of the D/L rule is that it acknowledges that there are two resources available to the
batting side and that a combination of these two resources must be used to reset the
victory target. There is however certainly more than one way to evaluate the trade-off
between resources. One could, in this respect, ask some intriguing questions: When
could one call this a ‘fair’ trade-off? Are both resources equally important? If not, what
are the relative weights of both resources? What is the justiﬁcation of setting the
weights as they are? Another aspect is raising eyebrows as well. It is quite reasonable to
search for thehypothetical value of the scoreif the innings had not been curtailed. This
is of course a counterfactual exercise with a hypothetical outcome, calculated on the
basisof a setof data of pastmatches. Itstrikesmeas odd that theexpected hypothetical
total is based on some kind of averaging of results from the past rather than based on
the actual run-scoring trajectory of the team before the interruption. The latter
method deﬁnitely reﬂects much better the actual (external) conditions of play, the
performance of the team, the strategy decided upon and the tactics involved. One
should not forget after all that one is dealing with interrupted matches due to bad
weather, which usually does not come unexpected. Bad conditions might already have
inﬂuenced the conditions before the interruption. In my view, an average of past
matches does not mirror the (external) conditions of the ﬁrst team in the best possible
way. One could summarize this objection in a lapidary manner: ‘The second team has
to beat (the average of) the game, rather than the other team’. Perhaps the next step
will demonstrate some improvement on this.
The second step is to calculate from the number of expected runs the more
advantageous quantity of the percentage of resources remaining. The proportion of
resources remaining is deﬁned as P(u,w), when u overs are left to be played and w
wickets have been lost. It can be obtained easily once one has Z(u, w) for 0 # u # 50




Table 1 Extract from the Table of Resource Remaining Percentages (2002) P(u,w) values
where u is Overs remaining and w is Wickets taken
w 0257 9
50 100 85.1 49 22 4.7
40 89.3 77.8 47.6 22 4.7
30 75.1 67.3 44.7 21.8 4.7
25 66.5 60.5 42.2 21.6 4.7
20 56.6 52.4 38.6 21.2 4.7
10 32.1 30.8 26.1 17.9 4.7










200The nominator is the average runs of all the past matches taken into consideration and
calculated to amount 235 (or whatever number decided upon for the appropriate class
of game). [4] The percentage of resources remaining is then the number of expected
runs divided by 235. Table 1 gives the values of P(u,w) for some u’s and w’s, allowing
us to determine the percentage of resources remaining from these positions in an
innings.
For instance, suppose that after 30 out of 50 overs a team has lost 2 wickets. From
the table one easily derives that the percentage of resources remaining with 20 overs
left P(20, 2) is 52.4 per cent. Suppose now that it starts to rain cats and dogs and 10
overs are lost from the innings. When play resumes there are only 10 overs left but
there are still, of course, 2 wickets down, and the table now tells us that the percentage
resources remaining P(10, 2) is 30.8 per cent. Due to the shortening of the innings the
team has lost a resource percentage of 52.4–30.8 ¼ 21.6 per cent. Having started with
a resource percentage of 100 per cent and lost 21.6 per cent, then if they complete their
innings with no further loss of overs, they will have had a resource percentage available
for their innings of 100 2 21.6 ¼ 78.4 per cent. Q3
What to say about the second step? It transforms the number of expected runs
into a percentage of resources left. This is done by dividing the expected outcome
by the average expected outcome thereby assuming that the expected outcome will
never be higher than 235. This implies that the formula to calculate the actual
expected outcome is designed to deliver outcomes in the interval 0–235. Since
235 is an average, one could reasonably expect that a lot of games have outcomes
above 235. It seems strange that an average (which, moreover, is an arbitrary
number) is set as a maximum. The problems this causes will be scrutinized at
length in the next section. It should be noted that the users of the D/L method
do not have to make any of these calculations themselves. They are only advised
to learn to apply the table of resource remaining percentages and to proceed with
step three.
Finally, the third step proposes a way to establish the victory target. Take S to be
Team 1’s total score and P1(u,w), or P1 for short, is the resource percentage (relative to
a full 50-over innings) available to Team 1 and, similarly, P2 is the resource percentage
remaining for Team 2. T is Team 2’s target score. If P2 differs from P1 a revised target
must be set. Calculate this revised target as follows:
If P2 , P1, that is, if Team 2 has fewer resources available than Team 1, Team 2’s
revised target isobtained by reducing Team 1’s score S in the ratio of P2 to P1, ignoring






If P2 ¼ P1, no revision is needed and Team 2’s target is one more run than team 1’s
score, that is, T ¼ S þ 1.
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240If P2 . P1, that is, if Team 2 has more resources available than Team 1, calculate
the amount of excess P2–P1, and take this percentage of the average 50-over total,
G50 ¼ Z(50,0), to give the extra runs needed, ignoring any ﬁgures after the decimal
point, that is,
T ¼½ S þð P2 2 P1Þ:G50=100 þ1:ðHenceforthsituationC:Þ
Q4
What to sayabout thethirdstage? Here therule reveals its main goal:the proportion
of the actual runs scored by Team 1 over the target score of Team 2 should reﬂect the
proportion of resources remaining (see situation A). However, a simple proportional
solution – ‘scaling down’ using the ratio of the resources available – is not available in
situations like C. Let me illustrate this signiﬁcant difference by means of examples of
situation A and situation C, respectively.
I shall continue with an earlier example to illustrate situation A. [5] Team 2 has lost
2 wickets in scoring 120 runs in 30 overs. Play is then suspended and 10 overs are lost.
Team 1 has scored 200 runs from their 50 overs. What is Team 2’s revised target? I
calculated above that Team 2’s remaining resource percentage is 78.4 per cent. Team 2
had clearly less resource available (78.4 per cent) than Team 1 (100 per cent) and so to
obtain the target, Team 1’s score must be scaled down by the ratio of resources
available, 78.4/100. Team 1 scored 200, so Team 2’s target is 200 £ 78.4/100 ¼ 156.8
which rounds down to 156 to tie with a revised victory target of 157. Team 2 thus
requires a further 37 runs to win from 10 overs with 8 wickets in hand.
In situation C, Team 1 has less resourcesavailable than Team 2 which is typicallydue
to an interruption to Team 1’s innings. Suppose Team 1 has lost 5 wickets in scoring
150 runs in 40 overs from an expected 50 when rain terminates Team 1’s innings. From
the table one could derive that the premature end to their innings has deprived Team 1
of the 26.1 per cent resource percentage they had remaining (P(10,5)). Having started
with 100 per cent they have had 73.9 per cent resources available for their innings.
When the extended spell of rain is overonly 40 overs are left in Team 2’s innings. What
is then the target for Team 2? Since Team 2 also faces a curtailment of its innings, the
resource percentage available has to be deduced from the table: P(40, 0) ¼ 89.3 per
cent. Team 2 thus has more resources than Team 1 had (89.3–73.9 ¼ 15.4 per cent
more) and so they are set a target which is enhanced by 15.4 per cent of 235, or 36.2
runs. Using the sum 150 þ 36.2 ¼ 186.2, rounding down gives 186 to tie and Team
2’s victory target is 187 in 40 overs.
It strikes many as odd that the target should be revised upwards in a case where both
sides bat an equal number of overs. Indeed, most rain rules would set the target of 150
because both teams face the same number of overs. The argument forwarded by those
who devised the D/L method against setting the target to 150 is, however, crucial to the
present argument. It runs along the lines of the following: Team 1 were pacing their
innings to last 50 overs when it was curtailed. Team 2 know in advance of the
reduction of their innings to 40 overs. This is clearly an injustice to Team 1 since Team










280increased target relative to the number of runs Team 1 actually scored. This means that
the D/L rule assumes that run-scoring accelerates at the end of the innings and, in the
context of retargeting, losing the ﬁrst 10 overs of an innings counts less than suddenly
losing the last 10 overs. This speciﬁc feature will play a crucial role in the next section
where the D/L method as a whole will be evaluated.
What’s the D/L Method Good for Anyway?
The D/L method has many advantages, which make it undoubtedly preferable to all
previously used retargeting rules. What are these advantages? It is possible, I believe, to
reach some kind of consensus over the virtues of any given rain rule. Without aiming
to provide an exhaustive list of such desirable properties, the following broad features
can be cited as conditions of a good rain rule: completeness (the rule must be able to
handle all kinds of interruptions, even multiple interruptions and other unusual
situations); consistency (the underlying mathematical model must be internally
consistent); comprehensibility (calculations must be straightforward, tables easily
accessible, or computer programmes user-friendly); realism (the rule should preserve
the chance of winning, that is, the reset target should be realistic); [6] impartiality or
strategic neutrality (no team should be strategically (dis)advantaged); and last but not
least fairness. The cricketing community at largeseems to be in agreement that the D/L
rule scores excellently on the ﬁrst four features. However, opinions are divided on the
question as to whether the D/L rule is impartial and/or fair. Let us examine to what
extent the D/L rule possesses the latter features beginning with impartiality.
Some commentators have provided substantial evidence of a lack of impartiality.
Chetan Shah [7] refers to the asymmetrical equations for resetting targets depending
on whether P1 . P2 (situation A) or P2 . P1 (situation C). The author expresses
his discontent as follows:
Though the asymmetry cuts bothways ... it favours Team 2 when it matters. To put
it loosely, [the equation for situation C] damps Team 1’s performance when it is
playing well and boosts it when it is doing badly. This is a Welfare Ethic – Tax the
Haves and subsidise the Have Nots. Contrariwise, Team 2 has its performance
ampliﬁed or subdued in the same direction as its early showing. A Free Market
System where the rich get richer and the poor poorer. The twin policies deny Team 1
the cutting edge at the high end where it is most valuable. [8]
Honesty requires me to say that in practice the equations deliver acceptable results in
most situations. Without going into technicalities, it is only in cases where few
statistics are available (typically for interruptions at the beginning of an innings), and
when high scores are on the cards that the dampening factor included in the equation
may play up. A solution for this problem, though technically possible, would reduce
the ease of application of the method by scorers and is for this very reason not
introduced by D/L.
Nevertheless this asymmetry between the equations impairs the quality of
impartiality and mayeven lead to strategicoptions, which arenot equally open to both
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320teams. Consider the following instance. When the target is large and Team 2 foresees a
substantial reduction of its innings, Team 2 could take the strategic option to keep as
many wickets as possible in hand, even if the scoring rate is less than required. A score
of 99/1 after 25 overs in the second innings against a target of 286 for 50 overs would
win if no further play is possible (and also 110/2, 123/3 140/4, or 161/5 ... would do
the job). Shah notices that this distorted result is not merely due to the scaling of
limited early data but also stems from an idealized assumption of how batting sides
deploy their resources during an innings.
Indeed, one of the reasons for adopting asymmetric equations is to account for the
timing of the rain interruption(s). As mentioned above, the D/L rule assumes that
run-scoring accelerates at the end of an innings. The D/L method thus makes
signiﬁcant assumptions about the way teams spread the use of resources over the
length of an innings. Although this should be considered as an important
breakthrough of the D/L rule, the fact that a victory target in some cases could be
revised upwards stirred up a lot of commotion. Most people ﬁnd an upwards revised
target advantageous for Team 1. The D/L rule assumes that run-scoring accelerates
which is a highly improbable assumption, critics say, since cricket is a game of
uncertainties. I do not think this is as great a problem as some might believe. Each rain
rule has to make assumptions about the run-scoring trajectory in lost overs. It is not
the fact that one makes assumptions that is problematic, albeit that the assumptions
themselves are open to discussion. I am sympathetic to the idea that the point during
the innings at which the interruption occurs matters for the game. Losing the ﬁrst 10
overs or losing the last 10 overs makes a world of difference. One could however ask
questions whether this general idea has been applied consistently. I believe that losing a
couple of overs during the period of ﬁeld restrictions reduces a team’s resources more
than when one loses the same couple of overs somewhere between over 25 and 30.
Many will agree that the ﬁrst period has much higher run-scoring capacity than the
second but the D/L rule unfortunately does not reﬂect this. D/L assumes an
exponential relationship between runs and overs meaning that run-scoring accelerates
right from the beginning of an innings. Loosely speaking: the more overs gone, the
faster runs come.
Apart from the fact that distortions may occur due to atypical early data and the
assumptions made about run-scoring capacity, the speciﬁc role of the average
(G50 ¼ 235) in the method might also bring D/L into trouble. The problem occurs in
low-scoring matches (for example, Team 1 scores about 120 to 130 runs) usually as a
result of difﬁcult batting conditions. If then P2 . P1, the target is revised upwards
and might seem too high. The D/L method assumes that, on average, Team 2 is
expected to total 235 in a complete innings. If Team 2 is only able to total about 140
runs the assumption that they will get to 235 is unrealistic. And it is this postulation
that causes prima facie an abnormally high target.
A similar objection refers to the situation where the total set by Team 1 is much
greater than average and the D/L rule consequently sets ‘well below average’ winning










360leading to the introduction of the entirely computerised Professional Edition in
2003. Duckworth and Lewis were at this point forced to sacriﬁce their admirable
aim that it should be possible to apply the method using just a pocket calculator
and a single table. However, this leads me to an even more profound criticism,
namely the ad hoc nature of the rule as a whole. The rule is changed almost yearly
to adjust for technical anomalies or for situations in which the outcome seems
unfair. This, as such, is not wrong – it is certainly not elegant – but more worrying
is that the adjustments do not proceed from a coherent underlying theory of what a
rain rule should do, a well-founded hierarchy of aims, nor any explicit concept of
fairness. Certain technical adjustments are introduced at the expense of one of the
method’s core aims (that is, easy application) while other such adjustments, which
would also require the aid of a computer, are overlooked, without explanation.
What this method seems to require – in addition to the excellent skills of
enthusiastic statisticians – is an ethically well-founded vision of what a fair rule
should look like.
Fairness therefore is a big issue. When cricket fans or commentators disagree
with the outcome of the retargeting, arguments often appeal to one’s intuition of
fairness. One then complains that the target ‘seems grossly unfair’ or one asserts
that ‘many will consider this target as unfair’. We have all encountered this kind of
talk. Fairness, however, is rarely ever deﬁned. What it involves is assumed or
invoked by a vague appeal to intuition. One’s intuition is often a good starting
point for an argument but should at least be made explicit. In my view, a rain rule
could be labelled fair if the outcome of the rule is in accordance with the rules, the
spirit of cricket and all that is valued in its traditions. What this all involves is
spelled out in the next section.
In Defence of a Responsibility-sensitive Egalitarian Approach
Rain rules and the D/L rule in particular have mainly been the ﬁeld of statisticians and
mathematicians. The D/L method is undoubtedly a correct method from a purely
technical point of view. It is well-designed and integrates sophisticated technicalities.
There is, however, more that can be included than techniques and statistical skills. The
spirit of the game, for one, should be an integral aspect from the outset. Until now it
has only been implied in a consequentialist manner. When the consequences of the
retargeting process have clearly not been in accordance with the spirit of the game, D/L
made some ad hoc adjustments.
Let us ﬁrst determine what the exact aim of a rain rule should be. It is, I believe,
to level the playing ﬁeld as much as possible or, more precisely, to restore equality
of opportunity for both teams in the event of it being undermined by the
interruption. This rather general aim could be interpreted in a number of ways.
Some [9] defend that the aim should be to preserve the probability of victory. For
the D/L rule, the aim is to maintain the difference between the teams. ‘The D/L
method maintains the margin of advantage. It does not maintain the probability of
FCSS 244131—29/6/2007—KREETHI—278708








400winning or losing.’ [10] Or one could come up with the idea of equalizing the
resources (by, for instance, revising the number of overs to be played and/or the
number of wickets available).
I am convinced however that the spirit of cricket should be used as a basis upon
which to construct a rain rule. Furthermore, I forward that the ideals implicit in
the spirit of the game are reﬂected exceptionally well within the essence of an
egalitarian orientation to ethics sensitive to the concept of responsibility. The
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian ethic is a way of combining the concepts of
responsibility and equality in a comprehensive and consistent way. [11] It reﬂects
the philosophical debate on egalitarianism in the realm of (distributive) justice that
began with Rawls [12] and spawned a series of inﬂuential articles by Dworkin, [13]
Scanlon, [14] Arneson, [15] Cohen [16] and others. Basically these egalitarians all
encountered a fundamental problem when shaping their egalitarian theory: equality
(of income, for instance) is never a steady state since there is an almost natural
tendency to deviate from equality through the voluntary actions of individuals
and/or involuntary events, incidents or contingencies. Some people spoil whatever
they have voluntarily while others lose all because they are struck by bad luck.
Theorists are then confronted with the dilemma whether to restore equality and, if
so, to what degree. While none argue that all inequality is necessarily unjust (and
that it should therefore be completely eradicated), few authors agree on the exact
cut (and the criteria with which to make that cut) between what should be restored
and what should not. Dworkin for instance argues that inequalities that stem from
preferences with which individuals identify themselves should not be levelled out
whereas inequalities which arise from resources should be. Arneson and Cohen, on
the other hand, defend that inequalities arising from voluntary actions should be
maintained whereas those resulting from involuntary events should be adjusted.
Since there are ‘involuntary preferences’ and ‘voluntary resources’ both approaches
are not simply interchangeable. The responsibility-sensitive egalitarian ethic takes a
particular stance in this discussion while at the same time leaving some normative
choices available.
A responsibility-sensitive egalitarian ethic could in this context be deﬁned as
follows: it is unfair if there is inequality among the teams due to factors which are
beyond their responsibility; whereas such inequality is considered fair if due to the
exercise of their responsibility. The normative question on the cut between the factors
within and beyond the ambit of responsibility has a straightforward answer in this
context: everything that has to do with the responsibility or choices of the teams
(strategy, tactics, overall quality and condition of the players selected for the team,
decision to bowl or to bat after the toss, etc.) are to be called responsibility variables
and everything that is beyond the responsibility or the choice of the teams (external
conditions, rain, timing of the interruption, light, etc.) should be termed
compensation variables. Any revisional rule should adjust for differences in
opportunities due to compensation variables but should keep differences in










440fruits of a team’s own strategic choices and overall performance should not be
hampered by external events that undermine the equality of opportunity between the
teams. [17] This, I feel, is part of the essence of the spirit of cricket. It is arguable, then,
that if a rain rule satisﬁes this kind of equality of opportunity, people will feel that the
revised targets are fair!
If the cricket community agrees on this fundamental starting point, a couple of
recommendations could be formulated for a fair(er) rain rule. At a conceptual level,
this ethics implies that the actual run-scoring trajectory should be reﬂected in the
revised targetas much as possible.As isoften emphasized in modern cricket, thetrade-
off between making runs and losing wickets is an important consideration in strategic
decision-making. Since this element of the game is incorporated in the runs and
resource percentage remaining, it should be reﬂected in the reset target. This is
something for which the teams should be held responsible and therefore
rewarded/penalised. The use of the arbitrary average of 235 in parts of the D/L rule
at various times misses the mark, particularly in low scoring matches (see above). This
element of the D/L prevents the target from reﬂecting the actual performance of the
teams and is for that reason not very fair.
A second recommendation could be advanced along similar lines. The point at
which an interruption occurs should affect the target. The moment of the interruption
is beyond the responsibility of the team – it is bad luck – and should for that very
reason be compensated for. Losing overs, for example, during the period where ﬁeld
restrictions are in place is worse for the batting team than losing overs when there are
no longer any restrictions. The D/L model does not sufﬁciently account for this. [18]
It is likely that a lot of the commotion surrounding the D/L rule would die down if
the D/L rule could be (re)built from its foundations with an eye to this kind of
normative framework. However, I do not claim that implementing such an ethic is
easy from a technical point of view. Some aspects of the game depend upon both
internal decisions and on external factors and these separate inﬂuences cannot be
easily disentangled (that is, non-separability between compensation and responsibility
variables). Where scores are taken as a proxy for (or direct index of) performance, for
instance, responsibility aspects (as performance) combine with elements of luck,
which are compensation variables. Nevertheless, it is not beyond the realm of
conceivability that a technique could be developed in line with this kind of thinking, as
it has some precursors in other contexts. In the context of distributive justice, for
instance, technical (re)distribution mechanisms are worked out upon the foundation
of a set of axioms, which, in combination, express the responsibility-sensitive
egalitarian ethic. [19] Such an axiomatic approach generates satisfactory results
(even in the case of non-separability). If, however, it turns out to be impossible to
design a rain rule satisfying our concept of fairness (or in the meantime), one
could shift to an existing rule, [20] which in my view already incorporates our ethics
quite well (without being explicitly built upon this ethic in a fundamental way as
advocated above).
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480Jayadevan developed a rain rule, which bears some similarities with the D/L rule but
deviates from it in certain important respects. Itis notmy intention to explain thisrule
in depth. I only wish to point to some striking differences from the D/L rule, the way it
expresses the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian ethic and where there is room for
improvement in this respect.
Loosely speaking, Jayadevan’s method combines, in a clever way, percentages of
wickets lost, overs completed and runs scored. He does not translate the former two
into one percentage of ‘resources remaining’ as in D/L. An even more crucial
difference is the type of mathematical function employed. The D/L method assumes
an exponential function to describe the rate of reduction of resources as the overs
get used up and/or the wickets fall. It means that they assume that run-scoring
ability accelerates right from the ﬁrst ball. This captures the fact that run-scoring
accelerates at the end of an innings but overlooks the fact that there is normally a
moment of stabilization somewhere after the relaxing of the ﬁeld restriction (which
in itself is considered as a period high in scoring opportunities). Jayadevan’s
method, however, assumes seven different periods within one innings and lets the
data of past matches do the talking. He employs a regression ﬁt and a cubical
polynomial function which expresses that run-scoring ﬁrst accelerates, then settles
down a bit and accelerates again towards the end of an innings. ‘Since the curve is
developed based on data at different stages of the match, it so happens that this
curve lies closer to the actual match situation than the D/L curve.’ [21] This meets
the (second) recommendation given by the proposed ethics: a fair rule should
suitably account for the timing of the interruption. The Jayadevan method out
performs the D/L rule on this point.
Another difference between both methods is the absence of any role for G50, the
average score in a 50 overs innings, in the Jayadevan model. The latter model
extensively uses the data of the match in progress to determine the target. In situations
like C, the target is scaled up using the ratio of the same variables as to scale down the
target in situations like A. This implies that Team 2’s target is always proportional to
Team 1’s score. Jayadevan thus avoids the rather awkward asymmetrical treatment of
situations A and C and all the evils that result from it. Recall the (ﬁrst) implication of
our ethics: the revised target should preserve the actual run rate trajectory as much as
possible. I believe that Jayadevan does a better job than D/L in this respect since the
arbitrary 235 is eliminated.
In addition to an appropriate appeal to fairness and other such advantages, [22] the
Jayadevan model has some drawbacks. The use of the rule is slightly more
complicated, especially in the case of multiple interruptions, and his justiﬁcation for
the method employed in constructing the two curves (that is, the target and the
normal curve) are not convincing. On this limited evidence at least, the Jayadevan
model seems to satisfy the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian ethic, which I take to












Most cricket matches are played outdoors, thus causing some of them to be curtailed
by external factors like rain. When this situation arises, it is necessary to adjust the
teams’scores in such a way to be able to hail a ‘fair’ winner at the end of the day. Many
rules have been put forward to maintain fairness between the teams but none have
proven to be wholly satisfactory. The D/L method is devised to improve ‘fairness’ in
cases of weather-affected matches. The D/L method revises the target in accordance
with the relative resources available (overs left, wickets in hand) to the two teams. If
interruptions cause Team 2 to have fewer resources available, then their target will be
scaled down. If, on the other hand, the stoppages result in Team 2 having more
resources available then their target is revised upwards to correct for the extra
resources.
The introduction of the D/L rule is deﬁnitely a great leap forward. Besides
possessing the right amount of technical qualities, it has other attractive features such
as completeness, consistency, comprehensiveness and realism, properties universally
considered virtues of a good rain rule. Above all, however, a good rule should reﬂect
the spirit of the game.
Apart from speciﬁc criticisms related to the respective results of D/L retargeted
matches, some objections are important from a more philosophical point of view.
Signiﬁcant criticisms are raised concerning the lack of impartiality, the intrusion of
such arbitrary elements as the G50, the general ad hoc nature of the method and the
absence of an explicit and valid view on the meaning of fairness. An ethical
underpinning of rain rules is sorely missed. It has been the purpose of this essay to
employ contemporary insights from egalitarian theory formulating an account of
what such a normative framework could look like. Such an account could either act as
a source of inspiration during the process of designing rain rules or as a touchstone of
fairness. Fairness, as an essential part of the spirit of cricket, implies that rain rules
should leave the domain of any given team’s responsibility untouched, while restoring
equality of opportunity via compensation (retargeting) in cases of obvious bad luck or
events beyond a team’s responsibility.
This analysis has taught us at least one important lesson: all future innovations in
the game should be assessed in accordance with both the rules and (a more explicit
account of) the spirit of cricket. There are seemingly endless proposals at present for
new innovations in the game, many designed with a view to levelling out the effects of
external conditions. This evolution emphasizes the need for a strong criterion. What
does fairness and, by extension, the spirit of cricket mean? Consensus on these and
other philosophical questions should be the ﬁrst step in considering such innovations
to the game of cricket. It has been the aim of this essay to provide a modest initial
impetus to the development of such a normative framework but reﬁnements are
certainly needed. One could come up with other frameworks, which are potentially
even more plausible. However, what needs to be stressed is that such explicit ethical
underpinning, whatever form it may take, is indispensable to the project of securing
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560fairness in the game. Perhaps then the whole cricketing community could conﬁdently
claim we are all equal under the sun ... and in the rain.
Notes
[1] Other examples include baseball and (individual or team) time trials on a single track as in
skiing, rally sport, cycling, speed ice skating, bobsleigh, etc.
[2] A famous example is the match between South Africa and England to reach the ﬁnals of the
1992 World Cup. South Africa saw their target of 22 runs from 13 balls change to 21 runs from
just one ball when a spell of rain took two overs away.
[3] Duckworth and Lewis, ‘A Fair Method of Resetting the Target in Interrupted One-Day Cricket
Matches’, and Your Comprehensive Guide to the Duckworth/Lewis Method for Resetting Targets in
One-Day Cricket.
[4] The D/L method was updated in 2002 to take account of higher scoring in recent times. The
average 50-over score has at that occasion been increased from 225 to 235.
[5] Since it is not our main aim to explain the application of the D/L rule, the reader is referred to
comprehensive guides to the D/L rule for the calculation of examples with multiple stoppages,
penalty runs and other complicated examples. Let me add that the D/L rule is able to deal with
all these situations and scorers only need a single table and a pocket calculator.
[6] Again, reference is common to the South Africa versus England match at the 1992 World Cup
(see above). The Springbok’s feasible target of 22 runs from 13 balls was transformed into an
impossible and therefore unrealistic 21 runs from one ball. Under the D/L rule, South Africa
would have had to score 3 runs off the last ball.
[7] Shah, ‘Cricket Come Rain or Shine – I’; ‘Cricket Come Rain or Shine – II’.
[8] Shah, ‘Cricket Come Rain or Shine – II’. For a similar comment see Preston and Thomas, Rain Q5
Rules for Limited Overs Cricket and Probabilities of Victory, 9: ‘If the team batting ﬁrst is doing
well then the opposing team would need to aim at a higher run rate than otherwise and to the
extent that the D/L rule does not take account of this it appears that it should favour teams
already performing well.’
[9] Preston and Thomas, Rain Rules for Limited Overs Cricket and Probabilities of Victory.
[10] Duckworth and Lewis, Your Comprehensive Guide to the Duckworth/Lewis Method for Resetting
Targets in One-Day Cricket, 27.
[11] See for example, Fleurbaey, ‘On Fair Compensation’; ‘Equality and Responsibility’; and ‘Equal
Opportunity or Equal Social Outcome?’
[12] Rawls, ATheory of Justice.
[13] Dworkin, ‘What is Equality? Part 1’ and ‘What is Equality? Part 2’.
[14] Scanlon, ‘Equality of Resources and Equality of Welfare: A Forced Marriage?’ and ‘The
Signiﬁcance of Choice’.
[15] Arneson, ‘Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare’; ‘Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism,
and Equal Opportunity for Welfare’ and ‘A Defence of Equal Opportunity for Welfare’.
[16] Cohen, ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,’ and ‘Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods and
Capabilities’.
[17] It is clear that the Australian Rain Rule (see above) is a blatant example of a rule which does not
satisfy the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian ideal since the team bowling maiden overs is
deprived of the fruits of its excellent bowling.
[18] A thorough reﬂection of the proposed ethics would no doubt generate more recommendations
but these seem to be the most relevant implications for a normative analysis of the D/L rule.










600[20] Jayadevan, ‘A New Method for the Computation of Target Scores in Interrupted, Limited-Over
Cricket Matches’.
[21] Ibid., 583.
[22] Recall the partiality objection against the D/L rule in low scoring matches (see above).
Jayadevan would have required Team 2 to score 119/1, 123/2, 148/4 or 172/5 in 25 overs to win
which seems much more acceptable.
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